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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL WINSNESS AND ASSO-
CIATES, A Partnership, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
Case No. 15501 
M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS, 
INC., A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT AS TO COUNTS l AND 3 OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
A. There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclude 
that a Breach of Contract Had Occurred by the Closure of the 
Service Station and Sufficient Reliable Evidence was Presented 
to Allow the Jury to Determine Resulting Damages. 
The lease involved in this lawsuit provided that rental 
payments would be made based on the real estate itself and also 
upon the number of gasoline gallons sold per month. The lease 
provided that the station would remain open for 24 hours a day. 
It can thus be readily seen that if the station were not open at 
all during a 24-hour day then no gasoline would be sold and 
therefore no gallonage rental would have accumulated. 
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Respondent in its brief repeatedly states that Appellant 
was unable to prove "the reasons behind the service station be-
ing closed at various times". (Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8), 
This question of "why" is totally irrelevant to the determina-
tion in this case since there is nothing in the lease agreement 
which justifies closing of the station for any reason. The sti· 
pulated judgment provided that the station could be closed if 
gasoline allotments were not received. Respondent has never 
contended that the station was closed because of a gasoline 
shortage--if it were contending such a defense, it was its ob-
ligation to prove it not Appellant's. 
Thus, once the station was shown to be closed for any per-
iod of time the burden shifted to Respondent to prove that such 
cause was permitted under the terms of the stipulated judgment. 
The defendant never argued nor attempted to do this but rather 
complained that Plaintiff was unable to prove the reasons for 
closure on each and every occasion testified to by the numerous 
witnesses. 
Respondent states that "Plaintiff's witnesses testified 
du that on several unspecified occasions the station was close · 
(Respondent's brief, p. 7). To say the least this is a gross 
understatement of the evidence presented by Plaintiff. As out· 
lined in Appellant's brief in chief (pp. 10-14 l numerous witnes· 
ses testified that the station was "closed every Thursday morn· 
-2-
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ing", that the "station was usually closed during the weekends", 
that the station was hardly ever open during the night", and that 
the station was closed "at least 50 per cent of the time when an 
employee arrived for work." In addition, random pictures were 
introduced into evidence showing the condition of the service 
station during various times throughout the year. 
brief, p. 11). 
(Appellant's 
Thus, the evidence was clear that the service station was 
closed periodically throughout the time period when the lease 
required the station to remain open 24 hours a day. An obvious 
breach of the lease agreement occurred. The reasons for these 
closures are irrelevant and if they are relevant it becomes De-
fendant's obligation to justify them. 
Once the fact that the lease had been violated was shown 
the next question remained as to what damages resulted. In this 
case the amount of damages resulted from the failure of Respon-
dent to sell gasoline during the periods in which the station 
was closed. Respondent in its brief refers to American Jurispru-
dence as an authority stating that the fact of damages cannot be 
based upon speculation and that no recovery can be made in cases 
in which it is uncertain whether the plaintiff suffered any dam-
ages. (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-9). This statement of the law 
is correct. And, if it could be reasonably inferred that !!£ 
gasoline whatsoever would have been sold during the numerous 
-3-
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times the station was closed (as testified to by Plaintiff's 
witnesses) then a verdict in favor of Defendant should proper~ 
have been directed. 
However, since the evidence showed that the station was 
constantly selling gasoline to various customers throughout 
each 24-hour period the inference exists that at least some un-
known number of gallons of gasoline were not sold because the 
station was closed. This requirement to show the amount of 
damages has also been well stated by the American Jur i s.erudence 
authority. It states: 
Courts have stated that only reasonable cer-
tainty is required in proving the fact and 
cause of the injury, but that the amount of 
damages--once their cause and fact have been 
shown, need not be proved with the same de-
gree of certainty. This would indicate that 
courts are more lenient in allowing the jury 
to speculate as to the amount of damages af-
ter their cause has been proved •••• 
Damages are not rendered uncertain because 
they cannot be calculated with absolute exact-
ness or because the consequences of the wrong 
are not precisely definite in pecuniary a-
mount. An element of uncertainty in the amount 
of damages or the fact that they cannot be cal-
culated with mathematical accuracy or with ab-
solute certainty or exactness is not a bar to 
recovery. Nor is mere difficulty in the assess-
ment of damages a sufficient reason for refus-
ing them when the right to them has been esta-
blished •• 
One whose wrongful conduct has rendered diffi-
cult the ascertainment of the precise damages 
suffered by a plaintiff is not entitled to 
complain that they cannot be measured with the 
same exactness and precision as would other-
-4-
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wise be possible. And some cases have fur-
ther held that when the tort feason or con-
t~act breaker has caused the uncertainty, he 
will not be allowed to complain that the dam-
ages cannot be measured with exactness. 22 
Arn.Jur.2d, Section 23, pp. 42-43. (Emphasis 
added). 
This same authority goes on to state: 
Under such circumstances, all that can be 
required is that the evidence--with such 
certainty as the nature of the particular 
case may permit--lay a foundation which will 
enable the trier of facts to make a fair and 
reasonable estimate of the amount of damages. 
The plaintiff will not be denied a substan-
tial recovery if he has produced the best 
evidence available and it is sufficient to 
afford a reasonable basis for estimating his 
loss. Id. at Section 25, p. 45. (Emphasis 
added).-
Since Plaintiff did not maintain a 24-hour log of Respon-
dent's station the best evidence available to prove the damages 
caused by the closure was first, the prior history of the sta-
tion itself as shown in Exhibit 35 (to be discussed infra in 
this brief) and second, the expert testimony of Delbert Taylor 
as to what he believed that the station should have been able 
to produce in terms of gallons per day based upon the geographi-
cal conditions, his previous studies of that particular station 
and the number of cars which pass by it during the damage period. 
Respondent in its brief repeatedly states that Mr. Taylor's 
testimony "lacks credibility". (Respondent's brief, pp. 12-13). 
It should be noted, however, that the testimony was never stric-
ken nor did the trial court hold Mr. Taylor to be incompetent to 
-5-
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testify as an expert witness. 
Respondent's opinion that Mr. Taylor's testimony lacked 
credence was an argument for the jury and not for this court. 
It goes without saying that the fact finder is the exclusive 
judge of the credibility of witnesses and evidence. Page v. 
Federal Security Insurance Company, 332 P.2d 666 (Utah 1958); 
Shupe v. Menlove, 417 P.2d 246 (Utah 1966). 
Mr. Taylor was sufficiently credible to allow submission 
of his testimony to the jury. Mr. Taylor owned several service 
stations, attended B.Y.U., and majored in Business Administra· 
tion, worked for three major oil companies for ten years (Tr., 
p. 445), and regularly predicted the market potential of numer· 
ous service stations in his sales area. (Tr • , pp. 4 4 9-4 5 0) . 
He stated that he was normally accurate in his prediction of 
sales to a degree of 97 per cent. (Tr • , p • 4 5 0 ) • 
He testified further that he had had personal experience 
with the Delle Service Station in 1971 to 1973 when he made pro· 
jections for his company as to the marketability of that area. 
(Tr., p. 451). He stated that in determining the sales volume 
of a service station he looked at several factors including lo· 
cation, traffic count, the number of automobiles or trucks t~t 
go by the location every day, and the regularity of hours that 
a station is open. (Tr., pp. 452-462). The witness also exa· 
mined the competition in the area and the number of miles from 
-6-
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previous gas stations that a motorist would have to travel. 
('l'r, f PP• 465-466) 0 
Respondent argues that because Mr. Taylor made one mis-
take as to an example of traffic count that his entire testi-
mony should be disgarded. (Respondent's brief, pp. 11-12). 
This "mistake" again went only to the matter of weight and cre-
dibility and not to whether the jury should be able to weigh 
the testimony at all. In any event, this "extremely important 
error" as stated by Respondent (Respondent's brief, p. 12) was 
not critical since Mr. Taylor's opinion that a station located 
in that geographic area should have produced three times the 
amount of gasoline sales as were actually reported was not based 
solely on the "error". (Tr., pp. 469-470). 
The "error in question" concerns July 10 in which the wit-
ness stated that on that day the peak hour of traffic was be-
tween 11:00 at night and 12:00 midnight. The correct figure 
i· as stipulated by Plaintiff's counsel was 11:00 in the morning 
to 12: 00 noon. (Tr., A-3). However, this error on this one day 
did not taint Mr. Taylor's entire testimony as to his estimate 
of yearly gas sales. He stated, for example, that on another 
day, June 26, that the peak time for automobile traffic was be-
tween 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. (Tr., p. 459). He acknowledged that 
the traffic count varied from a day-to-day basis. 
Mr. Taylor based his opinion on a number of factors includ-
-7-
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... 
ing the fact that the volume of traffic passing by the service 
station increased from 1974 to 1976. (Tr., p. 460). He also 
based his opinion on the hypothetical offered by Plaintiff's 
counsel summarizing the testimony of other witnesses as to var-
ious periods of time when the station was closed and stated 
that based upon those facts the station would probably lose 
about 70 per cent of its car trade and all of its truck trade. 
(Tr., pp. 469-470). He based his opinion further on the number 
of cars which went by the station according to a monthly break· 
down as provided by the Utah Highway Department of Transporta-
tion. (Tr., p. 502). It was stipulated that these records had 
been used properly and that they were the official records kept 
by the State of Utah as to traffic control. (Tr. A-3). 
Respondent in its brief states, "The Court, as a matter of 
law could not submit this testimony, flawed as it was by the 
error in reading the traffic count upon which Mr. Taylor based 
his computation and his admitted lack of knowledge of the other 
factors which he testified were essential to an adequate evalua· 
tion." (Respondent's brief, p. 13). This statement flies con· 
trary to the well-established rule that the jury must weigh the 
credibility of witnesses and also to the rule that upon motions 
for directed verdict, the trial court is obliged to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the verdict is sought to be directed. Anderson v. Gribble, 513 
-8-
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p,2d 432 (Utah 1973). Nor can it be said as a matter of law 
that reasonable men could not conclude that Mr. Taylor's testi-
mony was credible as to his damage estimates and therefore this 
court cannot sustain the granting of a motion for directed ver-
diet. Anderson v. Gribble, supra. 
The Kratzers case cited by Respondent (Respondent's brief, 
p. 14) is not contrary to the position advocated by Appellant. 
In that case a bakery was wrongfully closed down for a period 
of time and damages were sought for periods extending beyond the 
closure. This Court stated: 
IIJt is not possible to say with any degree 
of certainty how much damage was caused to it 
other than the loss of the sale for that one 
day. 504 P.2d 40 (1972). (Emphasis added). 
In this case, contrary to the assertions made by Respondent, 
Appellant was only attempting to prove what damages occurred be-
cause of the day-to-day failure of the station to be operational 
and such a calculation is not speculative when it is based upon 
the station's full-service operation and the testimony of an ex-
pert witness. 
In summary, there was ample evidence that the station in 
Delle was closed at various periods of time and for various 
lengths of time during the years now in dispute. The lease for-
bade any closure for any reasons and the stipulated judgment al-
lowed closure only for shortages of gasoline. The fact that 
Plaintiff was unable to prove exact number of days and hours 
-9-
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which the station was closed was immaterial at that point since 
the lease had, as a matter of law, been breached. The amount 
of damages suffered because of this breach could only be proved 
by "the best evidence" available to Plaintiff and the defendant: 
cannot now complain that mathematical certainty was not sham, 
B. There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclud, 
that a Breach of Contract Occurred by the Failure of Defendan~ 
to Complete the Lagoon System and Sufficient Reliable Evidence 
Was Presented to Allow the Jury to Determine Resulting Damages, 
Once again, the respondent has completely distorted the 
language of the 1971 lease agreement and the stipulated judgment 
of 1974. Respondent argues that while it constructed the lagoor1 
system it was not required to obtain the final approval from th< 
State Department of Health because Plaintiff's restaurant had 
not been built and therefore the system could not be made opera· 
tional until that time. (Respondent's brief, pp. 15-21). 
This argument completely ignores the clear language in the 
stipulated judgment which states: "The lagoon system shall be 
designed and constructed to comply with the minimum requirements 
of the State of Utah and the County of Tooele." (Ex. P-7). Thi 
language does not in any way mention the word "operation" and 
Respondent's argument that the lagoon could not be fully "opera· 
tional" is therefore completely without merit. (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 16-17). 
The question was not whether the lagoon could properly opeI 
ate but whether it had been properly built so that at the appro· 
-10-
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priate time it could operate. The evidence clearly showed that 
the facilities did not meet health specifications because of de-
sign and construction defects and not because the facility was 
not operating at the time. 
A letter dated August 14, 1974 from the Division of Health 
to the defendant clearly shows the construction and design de-
fects: 
The inspection has indicated that the treat-
ment works, as constructed, deviate from the 
approved plans and that the existing facility 
does not comply with the Utah Code of Waste 
Disposal Regulations. Therefore, you are 
hereby requested to cease the discharge of 
waste water to this treatment works until the 
following corrections are made •••• 
1. The pump station must be equipped with 
dual grinder pumps, fan and vent. 
2. The section of force main at the ra-
vine crossing must be adequately cov-
ered or insulated to prevent freez-
ing. 
3. The inlet structure to the primary cell, 
the transfer structure between the pri-
mary and secondary cell, and the emer-
gency overflow structure must be built 
to conform with approved plans. 
4. The lagoon system must be entirely en-
closed by a six-foot high chain-link 
fence. Also, appropriate warning signs 
should be provided along this fence to 
designate the nature of the facility 
and advise against trespassing. 
5. The plastic liner in the lagoon cells 
must be covered by two inches fines as 
indicated on the plans. 
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6. The outer slopes of the lagoon dikes 
must not be steeper than two horizon-
tal to one vertical in order to main-
tain dike stability and guard against 
erosion problems. (D-38). 
None of these deficiencies resulted because of the lagoon's 
failure to operate at full capacity. In fact, had the res-
taurant been present and discharging the required amount of 
water the State Health Department still would not have passed 
the lagoon because of these deficiencies. 
For Respondent to state that it has "substantially complied. 
with the agreement to build the lagoon is also a gross misstate· 
ment. The plaintiff testified that it would cost him between 
$10,000 to $15,000 to complete the lagoon system according to 
State Code. (Tr., pp. 152-153). Mr. Art Maxwell, a civil en-
gineer, submitted a June, 1977 estimate that it would cost $9,31: 
to "complete construction to meet requirements of State Divisio~ 
of Health". (P-51). 
The plaintiff was not required to gamble that upon comple· 
tion of his $60,000 or $70,000 restaurant that Defendant would 
complete the construction of the lagoon in time to make the res· 
taurant operational. While a seller, under an earnest money 
agreement, is not required to deliver a clear title until the 
final payment in a contract has been made, the language containe 
in the lease agreement and stipulated judgment unmistakably pro· 
vided that the defendant would "complete the same within one 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
year from March 8, 1974". (Ex. P-7). Thus Respondent's anal-
ogy to real estate transactions is not appropriate. (Respondent's 
brief , p • 19 ) • 
Finally, Respondent's statement, "Until there is a restaur-
ant to use the lagoon system, the lack of final approval of the 
system is of no consequence to Plaintiff" (Respondent's brief, 
pp. 21-22) is another example of Respondent's reckless disre-
gard for Plaintiff's rights. Such a statement is equivalent to 
arguing that a home buyer should purchase a lot and build a home 
with the hope that a sewer and water line will one day be hooked 
to the lot to make the home inhabitable. And, the argument would 
then go, if such a line was not made it would then be the obli-
gation of the homeowner to spend money (if he had it) to put in 
his own sewer and water system. Obviously, the lack of existing 
sewer and water lines would be of "great consequence" to the 
mythical homeowner both as to his decision to build the home 
and as to his ability to obtain financing. 
Respondent's arguments concerning the breach of the lease 
agreement pertaining to the lagoon system cannot be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EXHIBIT 
35 FROM ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE WHEN IT WAS 
CLEARLY RELEVANT IN DETERMINING PLAINTIFF'S 
DAMAGES. 
Respondent asserts that "Plaintiff cannot have his cake 
and eat it too". (Respondent's brief, p. 23). Respondent ar-
-13-
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gues that since the 1974 judgment included a provision requi-
ring Defendant to maintain the station on a 24-hour basis that 
it must be assumed that Exhibit 35 did not represent a full 
24-hour a day annual operation and therefore was not competent 
evidence. 
This argument, however, is invalid. First, Plaintiff ne-
ver alleged in the previous lawsuit that 1972 was the year in 
which the 24-hour operating requirements had not been met. The 
complaint filed on October 3, 1972 in Civil 7761, Tooele County 
did not allege a failure to maintain the station open on a 24-
hour basis. Its provision did not appear until the 197 4 stipu· 
lated judgment when Defendants had failed to maintain the sta-
tion during 1973 on a full 24-hour basis. 
For the very reason now argued by Respondents the figures 
for 1973 were never attempted to be introduced into evidence 
since they were not reliable as to full operational capacity 
nor could they be used to prove damages after the 1974 stipula· 
tion had been entered. The court should note that Exhibits P-31 
include gasoline summaries for 1976, that P-33 included summar· 
ies for 1975 and that Exhibit 34 included summaries for 1974 
and that Exhibit 35 was a proffered summary of 1972. There w_!! 
no exhibit offered by Plaintiff showing the gasoline sales in 
1973. 
If, as Respondent argues, 1972 was considered not to bea 
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fully-operational year it seems highly unusual that the 1972 
sales of 452,045 gallons of gasoline" would be used by both 
parties as the basis to determine when the station was not re-
ceiving full gasoline because of shortages as provided in the 
stipulated judgment, Exhibit P-7, pp. 5-6. (See quotation in 
Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10). 
Finally, Plaintiff testified that 1972 was a 24-hour-a-
day year. The following exchange took place between Plaintiff 
and his counsel: 
Q I show you what's been marked for pur-
poses of identification as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 35. 
A Yes. 
Q I will ask you if you can identify it. 
A That was our gas sales in 1972. 
Q Now, in 1972 was the station operated 
on a different basis as far as hours 
are concerned and times than it was in 
74? '75? '76? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What was the difference? 
A They were operating mostly 24 hours a 
day. (Tr., p. 96). 
Quite apart from the obvious fallacious argument of Respon-
dent as to the irrelevancy of Exhibit 35, it should also be ob-
served that this argument was never made at the lower court 
but that it was always contended that the prior 1974 stipulated 
-15-
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judgment precluded any use of the 1972 figures. (Tr . ' p . 13 5 I, 
The trial court specifically stated that the exhibit was deni· 
ec, 
not because of its incompetency showing a 24-hour basis of aper: 
tion, but because it predated the 1974 judgment and therefore 
was barred. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 27, 29). 
Finally, Respondent concludes with the statement that "Ex· 
hibit 35 lacks credibility for other reasons" and then proceeds 
to list five such reasons. (Respondent's brief, p. 24) . Once 
again, as noted in the previous section, Respondent makes a j~ 
argument of credibility which is not a proper consideration of 
this court. Shupe v. Menlove, 417 P.2d 246 (Utah 1966). T~n 
cord will show that Appellant produced equally credible evidence 
that conditions had actually improved in the area since 1972 anc 
that more gas should have been sold. (See e.g., Tr., pp. 96, 
239). 
It will serve no useful purpose to argue the merits of the 
evidence to this Court and therefore the arguments of Respondent 
concerning the alleged lack of credibility of Exhibit 35 need nc 
further comment. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent attempts to confuse the proof required as to the 
fact of damages with the quantum of damages. There was suffi· 
cient evidence to show that the service station was closed dur· 
l not "occasic: ing long periods of time and that the c osures were 
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al" as Respondent views the evidence. Since gasoline could ob-
viously not be sold during the time the station was closed some 
damages were suffered during the days and nights the station re-
mained closed. 
The testimony of Mr. Taylor was competent to give the jury 
a basis for determining what the damages should be. This tes-
timony, in conjunction with the testimony of numerous witnesses 
as to the time period and days the station was closed would have 
given the jury a sufficient foundation as required by law to de-
termine the amount of damages. Had Exhibit 35, the prior his-
tory of the station itself during a full operating year, been 
admitted into evidence the jury would have had the best evidence 
obtainable for making a reasonable calculation as to damages. 
Unfortunately, however, the trial court refused to admit 
this valuable piece of evidence because of its predating of the 
1974 judgment and now Respondent attempts to taint the offered 
exhibit as not being indicative of a full operating period even 
though the evidence in the record is to the contrary. 
Finally, the trial court erred in not submitting the ques-
tion of the lagoon construction to the jury since the lease agree-
ment never required Plaintiff's restaurant to be built but did 
require that the lagoon meet construction and design standards 
of the applicable health codes. 
For these reasons, a new trial should be ordered so that a 
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jury can properly decide the numerous issues of fact and credi· 
bility raised in this dispute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
HENS COOK 
3100 South 
City, Utah 84109 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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